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Abstract- We empirically analyse the determinants of 
cash rent levels for agricultural land in Lower Saxony, 
Germany.  We  are  the  first  to  apply  a  spatial 
econometrics  approach  that  accounts  for  two  types  of 
spatial dependence simultaneously to cash rent data at 
the  farm-level.  Our  empirical  results  underline  the 
usefulness  of  such  an  approach.  Farm  characteristics 
which serve as a proxy for the marginal value of rented 
acreage  for  the  tenant  as  well  as  variables  which 
represent  local  competition  on  the  land  market  are 
significant.  Among  the  farm  characteristics,  operating 
revenue  per  hectare,  share  of  high-value  crops,  soil 
quality,  share  of  rented  acreage,  share  of  arable  land 
relative  to  rented  acreage,  and  animal  density  are 
significant  while,  ceteris  paribus,  neither  labour  nor 
machinery/buildings  per  hectare  nor  farm  size  are 
significant. In particular, animal density at the regional 
level increases the cash rent, underlining the importance 
of  local  competition  on  the  land  market.  The  analysis 
also  shows  that  subsidies  which  foster  competition 
among  farmers  for  rented  land  boost  landlords’ 
incomes.  Thus,  evaluation  of  set-aside  programs  or 
evaluation  of  public  support  for  investment  in  pig  or 
poultry  production  or  renewable  energies  has  to  take 
such side-effects into account. 
Keywords- Cash rent, farm-level data, spatial 
econometrics. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One goal of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
of the EU is to support farmers’ incomes. However an 
important  question  arises:  how  much  of  the  public 
money spent on direct payments, intervention buying, 
investment aid or gas rebate actually transforms into 
farmers’  income,  and  how  much  gets  passed  on  to 
landlords via increased land cash rents. To understand 
distributional effects of the CAP and certain national 
policies,  empirical  analyses  of  the  determinants  of 
cash rents are essential.  
While  studies  analysing  determinants  of  farmland 
prices are numerous, those that deal with cash rents 
are less common. Empirical evidence is quite limited. 
Brümmer and Loy [1], Doll und Klare [2] as well as 
Drescher and McNamara [3] analyse determinants of 
regional cash rent levels in Western Germany. Fuchs 
[4]  analyses  Eurostat  data  for  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands at the level of 
provinces and federal states, respectively. For the US, 
land rental market analyses have been conducted by 
Herriges et al. [5], Bierlen et al. [6], Roberts et al. [7], 
Lence and Mishra [8] as well as Jannsen and Button 
[9]. An important shortcoming of most studies is the 
application of regional data. By aggregating farm-level 
data into county averages, a considerable amount of 
variation  is  eliminated  and  important  information, 
such  as  the  impact  of  different  factor  endowments, 
cropping patterns or personal abilities among different 
farmers in a region, is lost. We thus argue that the use 
of farm-level data is more appropriate for analysing 
the determinants of land cash rents. 
In addition, the spatial nature of the data may result 
in  dependence  (spatial  autocorrelation)  of  the 
observations  under  study  (Anselin  [10]).  First,  cash 
rents may not only be influenced by covariates in the 
same  location  but  also  by  cash  rents  paid  in 
neighbouring  regions  (spatial  lag  dependence). 
Second,  disturbance  terms  of  neighbouring 
observations may be correlated, because they exhibit 
the  same  unobserved  characteristics  (spatial  error 
dependence). These characteristics may cause standard 
econometric  techniques  to  become  inappropriate. 
While  Lence  and  Mishra  [8]  as  well  as  Fuchs  [4] 
explicitly take into account spatial errors for regional 
data,  none  of  these  empirical  analyses  controls  for 
spatial lag dependence.  
Hence  the  contribution  of  the  study  at  hand  is 
twofold.  First,  we  apply  estimation  techniques 
accounting  for  both  spatial  lag  and  error  effects 
simultaneously.  We  thereby  account  for  the  spatial 
price transmission of cash rents. This is new to the 
field  of  agricultural  land  markets  and  the  combined 
spatial  estimations  are  rare  within  agricultural 
economics (compare Anselin and Bera [11]; Holloway 
et  al.  [12]).  Second,  we  conduct  the  first  empirical 
analysis of the determinants of cash rents in Europe at 
the farm-level.  
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The remainder of the article is organised as follows: 
section  II  illustrates  the  model  and  sets  out  the 
methodology, section III describes the data followed 
by the presentation of results in section IV. Section V 
offers conclusions. 
 
II.  MODEL AND METHODS 
A.  Economic background 
Mainly, we follow the income approach also used 
by Roberts et al. [7] as well as Lence and Mishra [8]. 
It assumes land rent decisions to be based on profit 
maximisation.  The  derivative  of  the  profit  function 
with respect to land then gives the marginal revenue 
product  for  land  farmed.  Now  consider  on  the  one 
hand a farmer operating only his own acreage versus a 
farmer only using rented acreage. The former might 
indeed be willing to pay his marginal revenue product 
for cash rent when he starts to rent additional acreage. 
The latter is however not able to pay this price for the 
total rented acreage. He also has to cover fixed costs 
from his revenues of the rented acreage and hence may 
just  be  able  to  pay  lower  cash  rents.  We  have  to 
account for this difference when it comes to the choice 
of variables because on average our sample farms rent 
more than half of their acreage. But even if the ability 
to pay for the considered farmer is measured correctly 
the  cash  rent  may  furthermore  depend  on  local 
competition  among  farmers.  The  marginal  revenue 
product  of  the  rented  acreage  is  shared  between 
tenants  and  landlords  with  respect  to  this  local 
competition. This will be taken into account by the use 
of proxy variables in the empirical analysis. 
B.  Spatial dependencies 
Basically  spatial  dependencies  are  modelled  as 
extensions of a standard linear regression model: the 
spatial lag and the spatial error model (Anselin [10]; 
Anselin and Bera [11]). While the former deals with 
interactions  of  agents’  decisions  by  allowing  spatial 
relationships  among  observations  of  the  dependent 
variable,  the  latter  addresses  spatial  patterns  in  the 
error  terms.  In  our  case  the  cash  rent  level  at  the 
observed location may be influenced by neighbouring 
cash rent levels, because farmers may act as tenants in 
neighbouring communes. Hence cash rents of nearby 
observations probably influence each other. 
Equation (1) illustrates the spatial lag formulation 
for this case. 
 
u X r W r + + = β ρ 1              (1) 
 
where r is the N by 1 vector of the cash rent per 
hectare (N = number of observations), W1 is a N by N 
spatial  weight  matrix  illustrating  the  spatial 
relationship, e.g. distances, among sample farmers, X 
is  the  N  by  K  matrix  of  exogenous  explanatory 
variables, ρ is a spatial autoregressive parameter to be 
estimated,  β  the  K  by  1  vector  of  regression 
coefficients to be estimated and u is the N by 1 vector 
of  random,  independent  and  identically  distributed 
(i.i.d.)  error  terms.  The  spatial  weight  matrix  W1 
illustrates the assumed spatial relationship between all 
pairs of observations. Usually W is row-standardized 
and hence the spatial lag operator W1r is a weighted 
average of cash rents at neighbouring farms. We will 
explain the weight matrix in detail below. If a spatially 
lagged  dependent  variable  is  falsely  ignored  a 
specification error of the omitted variable type occurs 
and the ordinary least square (OLS) estimators will be 
biased. 
Another  way  to  incorporate  dependencies  over 
space  is  through  a  spatial  error  specification.  The 
variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance terms, 
Cov[uu´],  exhibits  spatial  dependence  when  the  off 
diagonal  elements  are  non-zero  following  a  certain 
spatial structure. Formally, 
 
 
u X r + = β    with  ε λ + = u W u 2        (2) 
 
where the error u of the standard linear regression 
consists of an error lag W2u with the spatial coefficient 
λ. Here ε is the standard N by 1 vector of i.i.d. error 
terms.  If  a  form  of  spatial  autocorrelation  in  the 
disturbance  terms  is  present  and  ignored  the  OLS 
estimates remain unbiased, but become inefficient.  
If  a  spatial  lag  model  still  contains  spatial 
autocorrelation in the disturbance terms both models 
can be combined (see Case et al. [13]; Anselin and 
Bera, [11]). Formula (1) can also be expressed as 
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However  in  our  case  we  apply  the  same  weight 
matrix for both spatial components. Hence formula (5) 
becomes 
 
ε β λ β ρλ λ ρ + − + − + = WX X r W Wr r




Statistical  test  procedures  are  available  to  decide 
whether  the  application  of  such  a  model  combining 
both spatial components (formula 5 or 6) compared to 
an  OLS,  lag  (formula  1)  or  error  (formula  2) 
specification is appropriate.  
We  now  turn  to  the  specification  of  the  weight 
matrix. We define the weights wij within the matrix on 
the base of inverse distances between the communes 
farms i and j are located in (see formula 7). Weights 
are equal for farms located in the same commune. The 
weights in W satisfy wij > wip if farms i and j are 
located in the same commune C and if p is not located 
in  C.  Hence  weights  of  farms  within  the  same 
commune  are  larger  than  weights  of  farms  in 
neighbouring  communes.  In  addition  we  row 
standardise W. We also introduce a cut-off level at 20 
km
1. We use inverse distances and a cut-off because 
transportation costs increase with the distance up to a 
certain level beyond which a distant farmer is not able 











                                                 
1.  Different cut-off levels yield minor changes in the 
results. 











































The  data  we  use  are  taken  from  profit-and-loss-
statements  of  farms  located  in  the  German  federal 
state  of  Lower  Saxony.  They  are  provided  by 
Landdata Ltd.; the market leader of farm accountancy 
services in Germany. Additionally we include county- 
or  commune-averages  from  an  agricultural  census 
survey conducted by the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany.  In total we base our estimations on 4564 
farm  observations  including  three-year  averages  of 
farm-level data and commune- or county-averages for 




Table 1: Variable definition and summary statistics (n = 4564) 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
rent  Annual cash rent per hectare in € 
(2001 farm average)  
258.66  149.79  13.20  1495.0 
revenue  Operating revenue plus wages, rents 
and interest expenditures; minus crop 
premiums 
509.02  518.45  -7323.76  6967.0 
soil  Soil quality (Ertragsmesszahl)  3553.1  1440.5  1000  10000 
acreage  Farm size in hectare (1996)  71.91  41.25  7.50  630.68 
rentshare  Share of rented acreage to total farmed 
acreage 
0.55  0.26  0.0051  1.39 
arablerentshare  Share of rented arable land to total 
rented area 
0.70  0.31  0  1 
sbeetshare  Share of sugar beets in cropping 
pattern 
0.051  0.080  0  0.47 
potshare  Share of potatoes in cropping pattern  0.044  0.098  0  0.94 
vegshare  Share of vegetables in cropping 
pattern 
0.0016  0.0166  0  0.67 
andensity_ha  Animal density in 500kg per hectare  1.14  1.10  0  13.45 
labour  Employees per hectare  0.0264  0.059  0.000158  3.32 
capital  Capital per hectare (€/ha), capital 
stock minus milk- and sugar beet 
quota and minus land 
3741.2  2361.5  19.58  35848.4 
andesity_com  Animal density on commune level 
(500kg/ha)  
0.93  0.52  0.0026  3.40 
popden_county  Population density on county level 
(inhabitant/km
2) 
167.51  109.99  42.46  490.81 
popchange_county  Population change over eleven years 
(1995-2005) on county level 
0.0470  0.0471  -0.0746  0.139 
unempl_county  Unemployment rate on county level 
(percentage of labour force, 2001) 
8.91  2.193  5.5  14.8 
income_county  Average income per inhabitant on 
county level (€) 
15557  1174  13222  19056 
premiums  Per-hectare premiums for cash crops 
(in € according to 9 different yield 
regions) 
284.83  36.45  226.50  371.20 
Further controls: 
         
education  Education of farmer: (1) university, (0) 
other 
0.247  0.428  0  1 
regularbasis  Operation: Regular (0) versus sideline 
basis (1) 
0.074  0.262  0  1 
booking  Gross (0) vs. net book-keeping (1)  0.099  0.298  0  1  
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The rent variable represents the average rent of the 
existing  cash  rent  contracts  on  a  single  farm.  In 
Germany a considerable share of the rent contracts are 
signed for time periods around 6, 9 or 12 years and 
hence our variable also includes contracts signed some 
years ago. Thus, we take the rent data of 2001 which 
probably do not suffer from too many decisions about 
lending before the introduction of premium payments 
by the European Union in 1993. Additionally a certain 
share  of  contracts  may  have  been  set  up  between 
relatives possibly leading to a downward bias of cash 
rents compared to contracts at arm’s length.  
As  illustrated  above  we  cannot  use  the  marginal 
revenue  product  because  our  sample  farms  rent  a 
considerable share of their land. As a natural starting 
point for the choice of variables we, thus, use a farm’s 
operating  revenues  from  agricultural  activities  per 
hectare  except  premium  payments  from  the  EU.  To 
account for marginal revenue products of land which 
may differ from the average revenue per hectare we 
incorporate  additional  farm-level  variables.  As 
explained above we expect the share of rented acreage 
to play a decisive role for a farmer’s willingness to 
pay. Soil quality, farm size, the share of several high-
value  crops  (sugar  beets,  potatoes  and  vegetables), 
labour and capital endowment per hectare as well as 
animal density are also used. We instrument the farm 
size by its 1996 value to avoid endogeneity.  
To illustrate the local competition a farmer might 
face, animal density on the commune level is supposed 
to  proxy  for  the  regional  demand  for  land.  This  is 
especially  relevant  in  Germany  due  to  manure-  and 
tax-regulations  allowing  not  more  than  a  certain 
amount of animal units per hectare. As variables that 
may  represent  farmers’  benefits  from  quitting 
agricultural production we include the unemployment 
rate and the average income per inhabitant, both on the 
county level. For the same reason we controlled for 
population  density  and  population  change  on  the 
county  level.  High  opportunity  costs  will  probably 
increase farm exit rates and hence the supply of land. 
This should induce lower cash rent levels. 
We also use a variable for the premium payments 
that are paid annually on a per hectare basis for cash 
crops.  These  premiums  are  paid  according  to  a 
historical  grain  yield  reference  in  9  different  yield 




A Moran’s I test (Moran [14]) reveals significant 
spatial dependence. In our case we yield a test statistic 
of 16.4, which is highly significant (see Table 2). As a 
diffuse  test  (compare  Florax  and  de  Graaff  [15]) 
Moran’s I is indicative of spatial dependence, but does 
not point to a specific alternative. However we have to 
estimate  a  combined  spatial  model  (according  to 
formula  5/6)
2.  Both  spatial  components  yield 
significant coefficients. 
We  also  estimate  the  spatial  error  and  lag  model 
separately.  In  each  of  the  specifications  the  spatial 
components  are  significant.  Compared  to  the  error 
specification  the  log-likelihood  of  our  spatial  lag 
formulation is superior suggesting that cash rents may 
indeed  influence  each  other.  A  Lagrange  multiplier 
test  based  on  the  residuals  from  this  specification 
model can be used to examine whether the inclusion of 
the spatial lag term eliminates spatial dependence. In 
our  case  the  residuals  of  the  model  show  that 
significant spatial correlation still exists in the errors 
and  thus  the  combined  model  is  appropriate  (see 
Anselin and Bera [11], p. 265).  
 
                                                 
2.  We apply the Matlab routines for spatial econometrics 




Table 2: Results for the general spatial specification (n = 4564) 
 
OLS  Spatial error model  Spatial lag model  Combined spatial model 
const  104  *    211  **    9.67      -30.0     
revenue  0.0375  ***    0.0311  ***    0.0332  ***    0.0348  ***   
soil  0.00286      -0.00045      -0.00023      -0.00158     
soil squared  0.00144  **    0.00154  **    0.00139  **    0.00137  **   
acreage  -0.0665      0.0879      0.0858      0.1161     
acreage squared  0.000076      -0.00024      -0.000211      -0.000248     
rentshare  37.9  ***    25.8  ***    27.9  ***    28.1  ***   
arablerentshare  82.3  ***    77.8  ***    72.6  ***    62.7  ***   
sbeetshare  194  ***    225  ***    172  ***    133  ***   
potshare  46.6  **    52.7  **    41.3  *    27.3     
vegshare  296  **    316  ***    301  ***    289  **   
andensity_ha  5.68  **    6.50  ***    5.68  **    4.62  **   
labour  45.4      33.7      35.5      35.3     
capital  0.000341      0.000127      0.000149      0.000072     
andesity_com  92.4  ***    65.9  ***    59.1  ***    44.2  ***   
popden_county  -0.0421      -0.0241      -0.0096      0.0019     
popchange_county  646  ***    546  ***    336  ***    214  ***   
unempl_county  -3.12  **    -5.85  **    -0.48      0.67     
income_county  -0.0272  ***    -0.0261  ***    -0.0144  ***    -0.0090  ***   
premiums  1.23  ***    1.02  ***    0.53  ***    0.28  ***   
education  3.65      4.73      4.15      3.20     
regularbasis  10.4      16.2  **    14.3  *    12.6     
booking  -13.9  **    -16.8  **    -12.4  *    -8.2     
spatial lag              0.500  ***    0.690  ***   
spatial error        0.564  ***          -0.543  ***   
log-likelihood        -27094      -27075      -24449     
Moran's I  16.4  ***                     
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% or lower. 
 
 
Additionally  to  the  above  given  estimation  we 
conducted  regressions  for  arable  land  cash  rents 
exclusively. The obtained results are quite robust and 
underline the results of the given specifications. 
In  the  following  paragraphs  we  will  discuss  the 
results obtained from the combined spatial model. In 
line with section 2 we find that the operating revenue 
per  hectare  positively  affects  the  paid  cash  rent.  A 
revenue increase by 1€ lifts the cash rent by 3.5 Cent. 
Fuchs [4] reports a coefficient of 0.1 for his variable of 
farm net value added without premiums. Though the 
comparability  between  different  market  return  or 
revenue measures in existing studies is seldom given, 
most  studies  yield  positive  signs  for  these 
determinants. Our result is new to the literature since  
 
7 
we  show  the  influence  on  the  farm  and  not  on  the 
regional level. 
The  group  of  farm  characteristics  intended  to 
account  for  acreage  with  marginal  revenue  products 
that differ from average revenue also contributes to the 
explanation of cash rents. The squared soil quality, the 
share  of  rented  acreage,  the  share  of  rented  arable 
acreage  as  well  as  the  livestock  density  show  a 
positive  influence  on  the  endogenous  variable.  The 
signs of these factors are in line with the studies of 
Bierlen  et  al.  [6],  Drescher  and  McNamara  [3]  and 
Fuchs  [4]  except  the  sign  of  the  share  of  rented 
acreage. While Fuchs [4] yields a negative sign ours is 
positive in  contrast to our  expectation. The  variable 
may hence illustrate a tenant’s willingness to pass a 
higher  share  of  the  marginal  revenue  product  of 
acreage to the landlord. One can probably not identify 
this relationship by means of regional data.  
Also cash rents increase with higher shares of sugar 
beets or vegetables within the cropping pattern. Thus 
the expected positive influence of high value crops is 
confirmed. Bierlen et al. [6] also show significant cash 
rent increases if the considered acre is planted with 
soybeans for example.  
Furthermore  the  significance  of  county  averages 
like  livestock  density,  the  population  change  or  the 
average  income  per  inhabitant  indicates  the 
importance  of  the  local  competition  a  farmer  is 
embedded in. An increase of the livestock density in 
the commune by one unit (500kg) per hectare leads to 
a cash rent increase of 44.2€. Existing studies such as 
Drescher  and  McNamara  [3]  or  Fuchs  [4]  come  to 
equal results at least with respect to the sign. While the 
former  use  a  different  measure  of  animal  density 
Fuchs [4] applies the same measure of animal units per 
hectare and obtains a coefficient six times higher than 
ours. This impact of animal density is important for 
policy  makers  deciding  on  investment  aid  for  pig 
fattening. 
The  negative  sign  of  the  variable  for  average 
income  suggests  that  in  regions  with  good 
opportunities (e.g. in urban fringes) farmers may quit 
farming more easily and offer their land to tenants. An 
income  increase  by  one  €  reduces  the  cash  rent  by 
approximately  one  Cent.  However  if  regions  have 
shown  strong  population  growth  this  has  a  contrary 
impact. The growth may result in a lower availability 
of land for agricultural utilisation.  
The  coefficient  of  premium  payments  calls  for 
further analysis because it reacts quite sensitive on the 
specification. Nearly 30% of the premium payments 
are  capitalised  into  land  rents.  Existing  studies  like 
Brümmer and Loy [1] or Janssen and Button [9] yield 
somewhat  lower  incidence  levels  of  government 
payments,  while  Lence  and  Mishra  [8]  yield 
coefficients of nearly one for market loss assistance 
(MLA) and production flexibility contracts (PFC) in 
the US. An interesting new study from Patton et al. 
[17] reveals that decoupled payments which are linked 
to land fully capitalise into land rents. 
Interestingly, farm size does not seem to impact the 
level of cash rents. By the inclusion of measures like 
capital- and labour-intensity as well as animal density 
we account for farm size in the sense of the European 
Size Units (ESU).  
Comparable to Bierlen et al. [6] the education of the 
farmer  does  not  play  a  significant  role  within  our 
estimation. 
Lastly both spatial components are significant. The 
positive  sign  of  the  spatial  lag  estimator  ρ  with  a 
coefficient  of  0.69  indicates  that  an  increase  of  the 
average neighbouring cash rent by one € rises the cash 
rent paid by the considered farm around 70 Cents. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  investigation  of  agricultural  cash  rents  has 
yielded limited insights into the determinants of rent 
rates  in  the  empirical  literature  so  far.  However 
thorough  analyses  may  be  of  interest  not  only  for 
agricultural economists but also for policy makers. We 
show  that  the  use  of  both  farm-level  data  and 
estimation  techniques  of  spatial  econometrics  may 
contribute to the limited knowledge that exists.  
We  find  that  the  average  operating  revenue  per 
hectare determines cash rents to a considerable degree. 
Furthermore, farm characteristics such as soil quality 
and  the  share  of  certain  high-value  crops  increase 
rents, while farm size or endowment with labour and 
capital appear not to affect land rents.  
Our  findings  imply  that  government  support 
increasing agricultural income will be partly passed on 
to landlords via inflated rent payments. This holds for 
the per hectare premiums of the CAP on the one hand. 
On the other hand variables representing the degree of 
competition  on  local  land  markets  are  also  an 
important determinant of the payment shares that end 
up  in  the  landlords’  pockets.  The  strongly  positive 
impact of (regional) livestock densities on cash rents 
should  be  of  interest  to  policy  makers  deciding  on 
investment aid schemes for livestock production. Such  
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subsidies  step  up  competition  among  farmers  for 
rented  land,  thus  boosting  landlords’  incomes. 
Evaluation  of  set-aside  programs,  investment  aid 
schemes or renewable energies schemes should take 
such distributional side-effects into account.  
Future  research  should  focus  on  the  incidence  of 
premium  payments:  what  percentage  of  these 
payments  gets  passed  on  to  landlords?  An  in-depth 
analysis  of  this  issue  should  be  based  on  newly 
contracted  cash  rent  decisions  –  rental  agreements 
concluded  after  the  entering  into  force  of  the 
Luxembourg  Agreement.  Another  useful  line  of 
enquiry  might  focus  on  rental  agreements  between 
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